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Abstract
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I.  INTRODUCTION
One of the most noteworthy features of globalization  during the last two decades has been
the rapid increase in de facto dollarization,  i.e.,the domestic use of a foreign currency
(typically the U.S. dollar) in most emerging market, developing, or transition economies.
Foreign currency has increasingly been used, alongside the local currency, in all three of the
classic functions of money (means of payment,  store of value, unit of account).
In view of the increasingly easy access to offshore deposits (even when prohibited by law),
partly as a result of growing globalization  and progress in communications and information
technology, the authorities have been confronted with an uneasy choice between allowing
deeper financial intermediation  at home though denominated in dollars, or pushing it
offshore and stifling domestic  financial innovation. While some countries have actively
discouraged  dollarization through administrative means, most have chosen to accommodate
market forces by allowing financial intermediaries  to offer dollar-denominated  deposits (and
loans) to their domestic customers. In many such countries the process has taken hold to the
point where it is now appropriate to speak of a de facto "dual currency regime."
While highly dollarized countries could abandon their national currency altogether and opt
instead for the exclusive use of foreign currency as legal tender, only a few have so far made
that choice.  But neither have such countries generally taken the steps needed to rehabilitate
the local currency as the medium of choice in intermediation.  In most cases, surges in
dollarization have come in response to clearly identified episodes  of monetary chaos that
undermined the credibility of the local currency. The difficulties faced by national authorities
in restoring their reputation  and credibly committing to sound monetary policies seem to
have raised the bar too high for most of those contemplating to follow this route, and many
seem to regard dollarization as irreversible and not subject to policy influence.
Instead, by allowing a dual currency regime to take hold, the monetary authorities have
hoped to have their cake  and eat it. They have sought to expand intermediation by allowing
the use of foreign currencies. Recognizing the heightened microeconomic risks of currency
fluctuation under these circumstances,  some have hoped to buy stability cheaply by closely
tying their exchange rate to the dollar. But by retaining the possibility of employing
exchange rate flexibility, the dual currency system seems to offer an insurance policy against
large shocks that is not available with a currency board.
This paper explores the extent to which the fears and hopes which have led to this policy
reaction are justified. Using a large sample of about a hundred countries, we provide clear
empirical  evidence  on the three main points at issue. First, it is true that permitting
dollarization  can support a deeper financial system, but only in inflationary economies.
Second, absolute pessimism with regard to the degree to which dollarization  can be
influenced by policy is not warranted:  we show that policy does matter. Finally, we present
evidence that intermediaries  in dollarized financial systems seem prone to higher risk.
The empirical  analysis begins with the determinants of deposit dollarization, building on the
work of Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003), and controlling for the impact of relevant regulations.
We find that macroeconomic  policy-partly captured by the minimum variance  portfolio- 4 -
calculated from observed covariances-and the institutional structure are both key
determinants of cross-country variations in dollarization.
Turning to the consequences  of deposit dollarization,  we extend the work of Honohan and
Shi (2003) to find that allowing de facto dollarization has in practice promoted a deeper
domestic financial  system, but only in inflationary economies, i.e., dollarization has the
effect of moderating the adverse effect of inflation on financial depth.
The third empirical  component addresses the contribution of dollarization to risk in the
banking system. Whether  we measure this risk by the mean ratio of nonperforming loans, the
volatility of deposits, or a proxy aggregate measure for a bank's "distance-to-default,"  we
find that risk is heightened in dollarized  economies.
The results point to a first-best policy of reducing dollarization's attractions through
improved macroeconomic  and institutional policies. Central banks wishing to reverse or
contain the growth of dollarization face the same challenge any producer of goods and
services faces: only products whose quality is reliable will sell. The experience  of the few
countries that have succeeded in reversing (or at least containing)  financial dollarization by
means of credible monetary policies and sound institutional frameworks supports this view.
Pending achievement of this first-best policy, the authorities need to address the risk
environment,  and to make sure that their own actions do not worsen it. Indeed,  in a
misguided attempt to avoid undermining the balance sheets of dollar borrowers  and banks,
monetary authorities faced with growing dollarization have in several cases moved to a
brittle regime, becoming averse to sharp exchange rate movements and displaying acute "fear
of floating" (Calvo and Reinhart,  2002). In tum, the perception of assured exchange rate
stability by the private sector promotes the moral hazard of further dollarization. Even if
agents are not unaware of the risk of devaluation, it seems safe to transact in dollars when
everybody else does so not least because a bailout of depositors and debtors becomes more
likely in the event of an abrupt policy regime change. This vicious circle can end in crisis.
Instead of falling into the trap of a brittle crisis-prone exchange rate regime, the authorities
need to deal with the extemalities associated with currency mismatches through a more
effective prudential policy that seeks to ensure that financial intermediaries  and their
customers intemalize the risks of dollarization.
Although there is a large and growing body of literature on related issues such as the
contributory role of currency mismatches in balance sheets to banking crises (cf. Goldstein
and Turner, 2002), currency boards and full (de jure) dollarization,2 home bias effects  in
portfolio selection (cf. for example Tesar and Wemer,  1994), and foreign borrowing, the
focus on dollarization has been largely from the perspective of foreign investors; the
empirical  literature on domestic dollarization (i.e., from the viewpoint of domestic investors)
is comparatively sparse (see Honohan and Shi, 2003  and references  therein). Instead, our
2 Especially arising out of the problems associated with the Argentine currency board. See, for example Mussa
(2002), and De la Torre, Levy Yeyati,  and Schmukler (2003).paper focuses on a domestic policy agenda, i.e., measures that can be taken at home to make
domestic intermediation  more resilient and the local currency more attractive.3
Section II documents the rising trends in financial dollarization across the world and
contrasts  such trends with the general decline of inflation and the asymmetric evolution of
other forms of dollarization, particularly real dollarization.  Section III briefly reviews the
literature on the determinants of domestic dollarization and presents new empirical results
that extend previous  findings in this area. Sections IV and V provide empirical evidence on
the potential benefits of dollarization  for financial  development,  as well as its-risks. The
following two sections address the policy response, covering both the need for heightened
prudential action to ensure maximum internalization of dollarization risks (Section VI), and
the implications of dollarization  for monetary and exchange rate policy (Section VII).
Section VII concludes.
H.  How BROAD AND UNIFORM IS THE MARCH TO DOLLARIZATION?
In this paper domestic financial dollarization is measured as the ratio of onshore foreign
currency deposits to total onshore bank deposits.4 This measure has obvious shortcomings. It
assigns equal weight to demand deposits, reflecting payments dollarization, and time
deposits, reflecting financial dollarization.  On the other hand, it fails to include dollar cash
and offshore deposits, which constitute a substantial fraction of investors'  portfolios in some
countries.5 It also ignores nonbank holdings of financial instruments, such as government
securities, shares in mutual funds, pension and insurance  claims, and all derivative
instruments, which probably constitute a dominant part of private portfolios in countries with
more sophisticated financial systems.6 Yet, it has the benefit of being the most readily
available. Thus, our sample comprises  100 countries, including a large number of developing
and emerging market countries, as well as countries that have transitioned from a centrally
planned to a market economy and some industrial economies.7
3The policy conclusions of our paper thus mostly coincide with those of Goldstein (2002).
4It  is useful to distinguish among three generic types of dollarization that broadly match the three functions of
money: payments dollarization (also known in the literature as currency substitution),  is residents' use, for
transaction purposes, of foreign currency in cash,  demand deposits, or central bank reserves;financial
dollarization  (also referred to as asset substitution) consists of residents'  holdings of financial assets or
liabilities in foreign currency; real dollarization is the indexing, formally or de facto, of local prices and wages
to the dollar.  In turn, financial dollarization may be domestic (i.e., associated to claims of residents, including
against the government), or external (i.e., associated with the claims of nonresidents against residents).
S On dollar cash holdings in transition economies,  see Porter and Judson (1999). Offshore holdings of foreign
exchange deposits are very sizable for many countries, especially in Africa (Hanson, 2002, 2003).
6 In Mexico, for example,  there are indications that claims on institutional investors,  which are largely invested
in dollars, have grown much faster than claims on banks during recent years. Moreover,  the scope for dollar
lending  is enhanced through the use of derivatives,  as banks lend a substantial fraction of their peso deposits in
dollars and cover their exposure through forward foreign exchange transactions.
7Our sample encompasses  the 1990-2001  time span but data for the full period are not available for all
countries (see Appendix Table  1).- 6 -
Very high rates of dollarization have been recorded in some countries in all regions of the
world, with the overall maximum of almost 95 percent in Cambodia approached closely by
the 93 percent recorded in Bolivia,  and upwards of 80 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Angola, and Georgia, for example and almost 70 percent in Lebanon. Clearly, however, the
dollarization phenomenon has not affected  all countries equally, with some countries
remaining nearly untouched.  In some cases, such as in Brazil, Colombia,8 Thailand,
Venezuela and some of the Caribbean  islands, official prohibition  of, or restrictions  on,
dollarization has limited dollarization.
With some exceptions, de facto dollarization has gained  ground across the board in recent
years. Annual trend growth in dollarization  across the world during the past decade is
estimated at about  1 percentage point per year (Box  1). All in all, 64 countries displayed a
clear upward trend throughout the sample period. Yet, there have also been important
variations in dollarization trends, both across regions and across countries. Dollarization
increased most sharply in Latin America and the transition countries (Table  1; Figure 1); it
also increased, albeit somewhat more moderately,  in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East; it
remained constant on average (and low) in the Caribbean region and the industrial countries.
The evolution of dollarization  over time has also varied substantially across countries
(Box 2). A handful of countries, including Egypt among the developing  countries, Israel and
Mexico among the emerging market countries, and Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and Latvia
among the transition economies, have experienced important reductions in dollarization  in
recent years.
Table  1. Evolution of Average  Foreign Currency Deposits to Total Deposits
(in percent, unless otherwise  indicated)
Regions  Number of countries  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
South America  8  45.8  46.1  49.4  53.2  54  55.9
Transition Economies  26  37.3  38.9  43.5  44.3  46.9  47.7
Middle  East  7  36.5  37.2  37.7  37.5  38.2  41.9
Africa  14  27.9  27.3  27.8  28.9  32.7  33.2
Asia  13  24.9  28  26.8  28.8  28.7  28.2
Central America and Mexico  7  20.6  20.8  22  22.1  22.5  24.7
Caribbean  10  6.3  7.6  6.8  6.7  6.1  6.2
Developed countries  14  7.4  7.5  7.5  6.7  7  6.6
Sources:  IFS, EDSS, and central banks' statistical publications.
8  Like Chile, Brazil and Colombia have also developed  alternative indexation  mechanisms, such as price-
indexed or floating rate instruments.- 7 -
Box  1. Estimating Trend Dollarization
Trend dollarization can be estimated from a pooled cross-section time series regression
yj,  = ao + fiyi,, + t,  where y is dollarization and t the year. The estimated coefficient
,B  is 0.63 with a t-statistic of almost 24; the estimated time trend coefficient y is 0.32
with a t-statistic of almost 4. These estimates imply that the trend share of dollarization
for each country, calculated as  (a, +  )/(1-  ,),  increases by about 0.9 percentage
points per annum, while deviations from the trend line are closed at the rate of
63 percent of the deviation per annum.
Surprisingly, the data set as a whole reveals no indication of a ratchet effect. A simple
test for this is to include the "maximum share to date"  as an additional  regressor (see
Appendix Table 2). If there were a loose ratchet effect, then economies  with a high
previous dollarization  should, all other things being equal, tend to have a high current
dollarization.  Thus, the historic high should have a positive effect, but in fact the
estimated coefficient is both very small and altogether insignificant (t=0.3).
An additional point is worth mentioning:  namely, there is an important mechanical
valuation effect linking exchange rate changes with measured dollarization shares.
If D is total value of domestic currency deposits, measured in local currency, F the
total value of foreign currency deposits, measured in foreign exchange,  and if E is the
exchange rate, then the dollarization ratio y can be written FEI(FE  + D). Rearranging,
we obtain:  lly = 1 + DIFE. Thus, even without any change in the values of D or F,  a
change in the exchange rate E will pass through to affect dollarization.  A panel log-
regression of the (log) change in y on both its lagged value and the change in exchange
rate suggests that almost two-fifths of any exchange rate change over the previous year
is passed through to next period's dollarization rate. Alternatively,  fitting
yj,  = a, + flM,y,  + )t + 5(e,,  - e,_ ),  where e is the log exchange rate, we obtain fitted
values as follows. The estimated coefficient ,B  is 0.68 with a t-statistic of almost 26; the
estimated time trend coefficient y is 0.34 with a t-statistic of over 4. These estimates
imply that the trend share of dollarization for each country, calculated as
(a, + yt) /(1 - ,8), and as such assuming long-run exchange rate stability, increases by
about  1.1  percentage points per annum, while deviations  from the trend line are closed
at the rate of 68 percent of the deviation per annum.- 8 -
Box 2. Varied Dynamics
Running against the general experience,  a handful of countries and areas had a
systematic downward trend'  during the sample period. The biggest reductions  in our
sample were in Bosnia and in Egypt; both are countries that recovered from very high
inflation episodes; two other post-inflationary transition economies-Slovenia  and
Poland- also saw sizable reductions.  More surprising is the presence in this group of
Hong Kong SAR and Saudi Arabia. Despite the falls, all of the six countries and areas
mentioned still have moderate-to high deposit dollarization-about  18 per cent and up.
It should also be noted that two emerging market countries, Israel and Mexico, reported
significant declines in dollarization during the first part of the 1990s (these declines do
not show up in our sample for these countries, which starts in 1997).
A further handful of countries experienced a hump-shaped pattern, with dollarization
first rising, then falling in the sample period. Two transition economies-Latvia and
Hungary-are  most conspicuous  in this category.2
About a dozen display U-shaped curves:  dollarization first falling and then rising.  Six
of these countries are transition economies  in Central and Eastern Europe (Albania,
Armenia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania),  and three are transition-type
economies outside Europe (Mongolia, Mozambique, Republic of Yemen).  Here we
may suppose that initial attempts at stabilization  succeeded in lowering initial  high
dollarization levels, but subsequently the general worldwide  upward trend resumed.
One (United Arab Emirates)  is an offshore center.  The last two (Chile and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo) are different.  The Democratic Republic of the
Congo remains a most unstable macroeconomy  as witness its always high dollarization
ratio. Chile's ratio has fluctuated around an increasing, though still moderate trend.
Eight countries (Bahrain, Belarus, Ghana,  Malawi, Nigeria, Russia, Tanzania,  Ukraine)
exhibit somewhat erratic movements.  The remaining 63 countries have either fairly
steady upward trends or only small movements.
1/ This analysis of contrasting trends is based on the following classification.  A steady downward
(upward) slope means that the latest figure is less (greater) than the maximum by more than 3 percentage
points and there were no years in which the figure increased (decreased) by as much as 3 percentage
points. U-shaped and hump-shaped patterns mean that the time series can be divided into upward and
downward  sloping subperiods,  using the above definition. Countries with less than 3 percentage  points
bracketing max and min figures are said to have small movements,  and the remainder are said have
erratic movements.
2/ The two other largest countries in this category reflect special events:  Greece's decline in 2001
reflects its adoption of the euro in that year; Indonesia's peak in  1997 surely owes much to the valuation
effect of the sharp devaluation in that year.- 9 -
The patterns in Table  1 and Figure 1 raise two basic questions:  (i) why has financial
dollarization continued to gain ground, on the whole? and (ii) what factors have influenced
the contrasting experience  of different countries? The first question is apparently all the more
puzzling in view of the stark contrast between the rising dollarization and the declining
worldwide inflation.
Figure  1. Dollarization and Inflation
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Before proceeding to explore these questions, some useful observations need to be made on
the extent to which different forms of dollarization are correlated.  Financial dollarization
patterns, as measured by the dollarization  of domestic loans (instead of deposits), are broadly
similar.  However, loan dollarization is generally lower than deposit dollarization as banks
often maintain a sizable fraction of their foreign currency deposits in liquid correspondent
accounts or sovereign assets abroad. The cross-country  relationship between loan
dollarization  and deposit dollarization is less than proportional, with a 10 percent increase in
foreign currency deposits resulting, on average, in a 7.3 percent increase in foreign currency
loans (Figure 2).9 This asymmetry appears largely to reflect the inherent risks attached to
dollar intermediation, that induce banks to limit their dollar loans and maintain large dollar
liquidity buffers.
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On the other hand, real dollarization (the use of the dollar for price and wage contracts)
appears to remain generally limited, even in financially highly dollarized countries.  While
data limitations prevent a direct measurement,  the pass-through of exchange rate changes
into prices provides useful indirect evidence.  A clear positive correlation exists between
financial and real dollarization (Figure  3). However,  the relationship is subjected to
substantial  variability and is much less than proportional  (the elasticity between  financial
dollarization and real dollarization  is only about 0.25), suggesting  that other factors  are at
play than those causing financial  dollarization.'0 This broad-brush econometric evidence  is
9  hi  asymmetry  was first detected by Honohan and Shi (2003).
'° Here we use the estimates of the one-year pass-through  reported in Choudhri  and Hakura (2001).  Similar
evidence is reported in Honohan and Shi (2003).-11 -
supported by casual evidence in highly dollarized countries, such as Bolivia and Peru, which
indicates that the vast majority of wages continues to be paid in local currency, with only few
exceptions (such as for some top executives). '1
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III.  WHAT CAUSES DOMESTIC DOLLARIZATION?
A.  Theory
Explanations for payments dollarization have been amply discussed in the currency
substitution literature, based on inflation differentials that penalize  the holdings of domestic
currency. 1 2 While some holdings of foreign currency deposits may also simply reflect the
convenience of having transactions balances  in the currency of payments, especially by
corporates involved  in foreign trade, this cannot explain dollar holdings in the financial
" Nonetheless, dollar indexation in  the real sector appears to have made inroads over the years. In  Bolivia, for
example,  it now affects most utility prices, pensions, parts of the tax system, accounting standards, and some
supplier contracts.  In Peru, a number of services, including residential  and commercial  leases,  real estate,
professional services, and insurance premia, are priced in dollars.
12 While the persistent use of the dollar once  inflation has abated (hysteresis) has been amply documented in the
currency substitution literature,  based on transaction costs and "network" externalities, the opposite
phenomenon,  the persistent use of the local currency  for payments, even at the height of hyperinflations or
when financial dollarization has become practically  universal,  is equally noteworthy. The wide availability of
local cash, which is supplied at no cost, and the injection of local currency through public sector payments
activates Gresham's Law, e.g., the public disposes of the "bad" local currency it receives by using it for
payments and keeps the "better" currency  (the dollar)  under the mattress.- 12-
system on the observed scale. As term deposits, rather than demand deposits, constitute the
bulk of total dollar deposits, explanations for financial dollarization clearly need to be based
on different premises. Under the reasonable premise that interest rate parity holds, at least
approximately,  interest rate differentials  should offset any predictable inflation differential,
equalizing expected returns in both currencies.  Thus, while inflation levels may still matter at
the margin (to the extent they distort the intertemporal pattern of debt-servicing costs),
explanations for financial dollarization  must essentially be based on volatilities rather than
levels. Domestic residents should prefer to denominate contracts  in foreign currency when its
purchasing power in terrns of domestic consumption is stable (e.g., the expected volatility of
the real exchange rate is low) relative to that of the local currency (as measured by the
expected volatility of inflation).
Based on a static CAPM model with risk averse borrowers  and lenders, Ize and Levy Yeyati
(1998) find considerable  support for this hypothesis. Domestic  financial dollarization can be
largely explained across a wide spectrum of countries through minimum variance portfolio
(MVP) allocations that reflect a closed equilibrium in the market for loanable funds and
depend on the relative volatilities of inflation and the real exchange rate. Ize and Levy Yeyati
explain the permanence  of domestic financial dollarization  after inflation has abated by the-
fact that the volatility of the real exchange rate may have declined as much as (or more than)
that of inflation. They find this to have been the case in several of the highly dollarized
Southern American economies and interpret it as a manifestation of "fear of floating."
This simple portfolio approach provides a number of useful additional insights.  In particular,
it identifies a causal channel from globalization  to financial dollarization (due to the higher
weight of tradable goods in the consumption basket, more open economies should be
financially more dollarized) and between financial dollarization and financial repression
(unremunerated reserve requirements or administrative limits on interest rates on local
currency deposits should depress local currency intermediation,  particularly under an
inflationary environment;  see Ize and Levy Yeyati,  1998, and Catao and Terrones, 2001).
Strikingly, the portfolio approach explains  the increased dominance of the dollar over weaker
currencies  as contract maturities lengthen. The uncertainty attached to future inflation (a
nominal variable) rises without bound over the time horizon, unlike that of the real exchange
rate, which is anchored by a long-term purchasing power parity condition. 13
Observed variances and covariances  need not correspond to their expected  values, however,
notably where there is a nonegligible probability of a major regime change ("peso effect"). 14
Thus, the persistence of dollarization can also be explained by credibility effects as enduring
fears of a collapse of the monetary regime and a return to high and unstable inflation lead to a
persistent wedge between expected and observed volatilities. In the extreme case of a fixed
13 The relative stability of U.S. real interest rates (together with the constancy of the real exchange rate over the
long term) provides an additional reason for preferring dollar-denominated  long-term  instruments to long-term
local currency  instruments (which are generally more exposed to interest rate risk). This argument is formally
developed by Campbell, Viceira, and White (2002)  in an intertemporal  portfolio model.
14 Persistent high excess returns on local-currency-denominated  assets accompanying exchange  rate stability,
punctuated  by occasional sharp devaluations  and negative excess return events, is a stylized feature of numerous
emerging market economy experiences  (Cochrane,  1999).- 13  -
peg, such as a currency board, the preference for dollars only depends on expectations of
how monetary policy would be managed in the event of a collapse, no matter how remote
this eventuality (Ize and Parrado, 2002). The probability and modalities of such a collapse are
likely to reflect a host of factors, including fiscal discipline, as well as the institutional,
political, legal, and even cultural environment.  Proxy variables capturing systematic
differences  in these dimensions can thus be expected to have some explanatory power for
dollarization  in addition to observed volatilities.
Lack of monetary credibility can also explain dollarization without resorting to portfolio
effects, when combined with the possibility of debt defaults.  Calvo and Guidotti  (1989)
provide an early illustration of this effect in the context of public debt. Lack of monetary
credibility (deriving from the monetary authorities'  inability to precommit)  can raise the cost
of domestic currency debt to the point where it becomes optimal for the government to
effectively default on the debt (through inflation). In such cases, the local currency ceases to
be an effective medium for financial  contracts. Instead, indexed debt (including dollar debt)
becomes the medium of choice. Jeanne (2002) shows that lack of monetary credibility can
similarly undermine the usefulness of the local currency in private contracts. The expectation
of a depreciation  under a fixed peg (that increases the risk premium on local currency debt)
induces a shift to the dollar because it increases the probability of default on local currency
loans and, hence, increases the cost of insurance  against devaluations. The rationale is much
the same as that of a driver who, faced with an increase in his insurance premium, decides to
drive without insurance.15
In all of the above papers, it is important to note, however, that dollarization is a rational
response to a weak monetary policy. The level of dollarization chosen by private agents
conditional on a given underlying macro volatility and monetary regime yields an optimal
currency mix in terms of risk-cost trade-offs.
In contrast, the possibility of debt defaults can promote socially excessive dollarization when
combined with moral hazard.  In McKinnon and Pill (1999), Dooley (2000), Schneider and
Tornell  (2000), and Burnside, Eichenbaum,  and Rebelo (2002), the source of moral hazard is
government intervention that provides free insurance against currency risk. When borrowers
and lenders expect to be bailed out by governments  in the event of a large depreciation,  they
do not fully internalize the risks they bear when borrowing in foreign currency. Instead, they
benefit from low and stable dollar rates as long as the exchange rate holds and expect the
government to insure them against potential  losses in the event of a large depreciation.
Because it is hard for governments  to convincingly precommit not to bailout, the
maintenance  of a stable exchange rate in a dollarized economy can be perceived as an
implicit commitment of the monetary authorities.  Thus, reneging on this commitment  is
viewed  as a "catastrophic"  systemic  event calling for government intervention.  In this
15 While contracting  in local currency provides a way for borrowers to protect themselves against a large
potential increase in the cost of debt, this insurance  benefit disappears when the high cost of insurance can itself
cause a default. Borrowers  prefer then to borrow in dollars because (for a moderate devaluation probability)  the
odds of defaulting on dollar loans are lower than those of defaulting on local currency  loans.  Risk in this model
is not measured by historic volatility and second moments but by first moments, as reflected in risk premia.- 14-
paradigm, large international  reserves and exchange  rate pegs (or quasi-pegs) can thus
encourage financial dollarization by enhancing the value of the government guarantee.
Moral hazard can also arise due to market failures or a deposit insurance.  In Aghion,
Bacchetta,  and Banerjee (2001) and Chamon (2001), because borrowers  are more likely to
default when the exchange rate depreciates  and their debt is in dollars, they do not internalize
the actual cost of dollar borrowing. At the same time, because creditors do not observe the
currency composition of borrowers'  total debt, and local currency claims get diluted relative
to dollar claims under a liquidation,  they require a high premium on local currency loans,
thereby increasing the cost of borrowing in local currency.  In equilibrium,  incentives  for
excessive dollar borrowing are thus generated from both the supply side and the demand side
of the market for loanable funds.  Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003) show that, by limiting the
risk of lending in dollars,  a deposit insurance that applies uniformly across  all deposits
exacerbates  such incentives for dollarization.16
B.  Empirical Estimates
Basing our specifications on the above theoretical discussion, we conducted cross-section
estimates of the determinants  of dollarization levels. Results are reported for three alternative
dependent variables:  (i) the 2001  level of deposit dollarization (ratio of onshore foreign
currency deposits to total bank deposits);  (ii) the average level for available  years during the
sample period 1990-2001;  and (iii) a calculated country-specific  equilibrium level for 2001,
based on a simple trend-augmented  autoregressive model.  The second and third alternatives
have the advantage of being available for more countries;  the third is intended to take
account of the many countries which experienced substantial  variation in dollarization during
the sample period and for which the simple average would be unrepresentative of the
equilibrium situation at the end of the period. In the event, results for the three alternative
dependent variables are quite similar,  as are those (unreported) for a fourth, namely the
maximum level of dollarization recorded for each country during 1990-2001.
To account for the impact of administrative restrictions on dollar deposits, we constructed a
dummy variable based on several indicators.' 7 The main additional explanatory variables
16 Risk factors can also work against dollarization. For instance,  the risk of local bank failure could encourage
the export (legal or otherwise) of all but local currency transactions balances to offshore banks, thereby
lowering (onshore) dollarization. The same would apply to the risk of expropriation  or capital levies,  more so if
these were expected to be selectively applied to foreign exchange  deposits (as with compulsory conversions at
off-market rates in the case of Mexico,  1982 and Argentina,  2001 to mention just the most well-known).  Fear of
imposition of capital controls or the introduction of non-market-clearing  exchange rates would fall into the
same category.
17 The IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions contains information about
the regulatory position in this regard.  Our summary of the major features is tabulated in Appendix  Table 3 for
the countries in our dollarization sample, along with particulars  for a handful of other countries included as
controls. These additional countries are included because  they either have or had in the recent past rather
restrictive rules about resident onshore  foreign currency deposits. Not surprisingly, most of the countries for
which we have data on dollarization have  a fairly liberal regime. Indeed, the trend has been generally towards
liberalization in this regard. For example, the table provides an instant explanation for the very low rate of
dollarization recorded for tiny Dominica: this can easily be attributed to the restrictive rules.  On the other hand,
although Appendix Table 3  shows our own simple composite index of restrictiveness,  it is not possible from the
(continued)- 15 -
employed in the estimation are intended to capture the risk environment.  They include:
(i) risk measures based on observed price movements: the "warranted" dollarization share
based on the minimum variance portfolio calculated  from historic variances  and covariances
of prices and exchange rates (as discussed above),'8 and the correlation between the price of
foreign exchange  and GDP as a measure of the potential of the dollar as a real hedge;'9
(ii) proxies for policy credibility effects, including the rate of inflation;20 the adoption of a
formal inflation targeting regime;  institutional variables based on the measures of political
and institutional development originally assembled by Kauftman,  Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton
(KKZ,  1999) and a measure of legal protections of creditors;2'  and (iii)  a dummy regional
variable for countries in transition.22
The results reported in Regression Tables 2 (A, B and C) show that the "market share" of
foreign-currency-denominated  deposits does respond as anticipated to indicators of the
overall risk environment.  Regression  1.1  shows the role of the core regulatory and market
risk factors. The dummy variable measuring administrative  restrictions is highly significant
with a coefficient that implies that shifting from completely unrestricted  to highly restricted
would lower dollarization by about 37 percentage points. The predicted minimum variance
portfolio is also highly significant with a coefficient  that implies that an increase of
2 percentage points in the minimum variance portfolio would increase actual dollarization by
almost 1 percentage  point. These two variables remain significant through all of the
specifications  explored and their coefficients remain of the same order of magnitude
throughout, though with the minimum variance portfolio's impact falling to about one for
three instead of one for two.
information provided to be confident of having obtained a fully satisfactory overall index.  For example, when
the Report states that prior approval is required,  it is  not clear how much discretion is applied and whether
implicit or unreported  requirements for such approval  are significant.
18  The calculation is  A =  V(Ir) +  Cov(Ir,s)  where 7r is inflation and s is real depreciation. The underlying
V(yr) +  V(s) +  2Cov(r, s)
model assumes uncovered  interest parity and thus the minimum  variance portfolio depends only on price and
exchange rate covariances (cf. Ize and Levy-Yeyati,  2003).
19  Because exchange rate depreciations are  often accompanied by output drops when caused by external  shocks
or confidence crises,  the dollar may be viewed as a "safe haven" by depositors if it provides high financial
returns at a time when real incomes are falling.
20  The rate of inflation, measured as a multi-year average,  is seen as a measure of overall macroeconomic
stability  and credibility and not as a rate of return: after all it is not the opportunity cost of holding interest-
bearing local  currency deposits.
21 The legal protections variable employed is based on the historic origin of each country's  legal system and
draws on extensive recent econometric analysis of the relevance of legal protection  of creditors for different
aspects of financial development (cf.  La Porta et al.,  1998; Levine et al.,  1999).
22 We also used trade openness in unreported  equations,  but it was not significant.Table 2-A. Cross-sectional  Determinants of Dollarization
(Dependent Variable:  2001  dollarization)
Equation:  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  30.6  ***8.9  50.2  ***10.0  44.47  ***7.6  40.3  ***5.3  28.6  ***3.4  31.6  ***3.7
Restrictions on doll  -7.48  ***3.1  -6.90  ***4.2  -8.24  ***4.4  -8.69  ***4.6  -7.59  ***4.2  -8.01  ***4.6
Min. var. portfolio  46.6  ***3.7  34.8  ***3.0  35.2  ***2.7  31.8  ***2.4  33.4  ***2.6  30.2  **2.4
Inflation (log)  8.16  ***4.7  4.74  *1.9  3.73  1.3  2.50  0.9  2.72  1.0
Institutions  -9.26  **2.0  -10.3  **2.2  -8.92  **2.0  -6.88  1.5
Transition  8.39  1.4  17.2  ***2.7  16.3  ***2.7
Legal protections  13.9  **2.2  13.7  **2.3
Inflat Targeting  -11.6  *1.9
R-squared / NOBS  0.221  78  0.406  72  0.439  70  0.457  70  0.491  70  0.511  70
Adjusted R-squared  0.200  0.380  0.404  0.414  0.442  0.456
S.E.  of regression  24.1  21.4  21.1  20.9  20.4  20.2
Log likelihood  -357.4  -320.8  -310.1  -309.0  -306.7  -305.3
Equation:  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.10  1.11  1.12
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  33.7  ***4.2  31.8  ***3.7  34.6  ***3.5  36.5  ***3.7  48.7  ***6.3  37.6  ***39
Restrictions on doll  -7.50  ***4.0  -8.0  ***4.4  -6.44  ***3.5  -6.61  ***3.6  -7.65  ***3.9  -6.02  ***3.3
Min. var. portfolio  30.8  ***2.7  30.1  **2.5  25.2  **2.1  26.9  **2.2  28.1  **2.2  22.2  *1.9
Inflation (log)  4.40  **2.1  3.13  1.2  3.90  1.3  4.11  1.4  5.36  *1.7  5.25  *1.8
Institutions  -4.43  0.9  -2.47  0.5  -2.86  0.6  -7.23  1.5  1.16  0.2
Transition  16.9  ***2.8  17.0  ***2.9  12.3  ***11.7  9.81  1.5  -0.50  0.1  15.7  **2.5
InstitutionsxTransn  -13.9  **2.4  -10.8  *1.7  -20.6  ***3.1
Legal protections  15.9  **2.5  14.8  **2.4  17.6  **2.2  16.0  *1.9  18.3  **2.1
Inflat Targeting  -13.4  **2.3  -11.7  *1.9  -12.0  1.5  -9.86  1.2  -9.94  1.2
GDP-hedge  -5.14  0.9  -8.64  1.2  -13.0  **2.1  -7.52  1.2
GDP-hdg x Transn  12.1  1.1  20.8  **2.1  10.6  1.1
R-squared / NOBS  0.516  70  0.522  70  0.520  56  0.529  56  0.477  56  0.560  56
Adjusted R-squared  0.462  0.460  0.438  0.437  0.413  0.462
S.E. of regression  20.0  20.1  20.0  20.0  20.5  19.6
Log likelihood  -304.9  -304.5  -242.4  -241.8  -244.8  -239.9
***  **, and  * indicate significance  at the  1%,  5%, and  10%  levels, respectively.Table 2-B. Cross-sectional Determinants of Dollarization
(Dependent Variable:  Average Dollarization)
Equation:  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  26.3  ***8.5  43.5  ***10.0  39.2  ***7.6  34.7  ***5.1  25.8  ***3.6  27.9  ***3.7
Restrictions on doll  -5.65  ***3.6  -5.02  ***3.8  -5.87  ***3.9  -6.4  ***4.2  -5.47  ***3.7  -6.33  ***4.4
Min. var. portfolio  38.0  ***3.5  29.9  ***2.7  30.7  **2.4  26.7  **2.1  27.8  **2.3  25.6  **2.1
Inflation  (log)  7.04  ***4.9  4.60  **2.3  3.45  1.4  2.44  1.1  2.69  1.2
Institutions  -6.39  *1.8  -7.63  **2.0  -6.80  *1.9  4.59  1.2
Transition  9.39  *1.7  15.9  ***2.9  15.9  ***2.9
Legal protections  10.8  **2.1  11.2  **2.2
Inflat Targeting  -9.32  1.5
R-squared / NOBS  0.199  84  0.382  77  0.401  75  0.432  75  0.462  75  0.488  75
Adjusted R-squared  0.179  0.357  0.367  0.390  0.414  0.434
S.E. of regression  20.5  18.5  18.4  18.1  17.7  17.5
Log likelihood  -371.5  -331.9  -322.3  -320.4  -318.3  -312.7
Equation:  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.10  1.11  1.12
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  29.6  ***4.5  28.0  ***3.8  29.6  ***3.7  30.7  ***3.9  42.5  ***6.1  31.8  ***4.0
Restrictions on doll  -6.01  ***4.1  -6.34  ***4.4  -4.97  ***3.4  -4.99  ***3.5  -5.11  ***3.2  -4.72  ***3.4
Min. var. portfolio  26.2  **2.3  25.6  **2.1  20.4  *1.7  21.5  *1.8  21.4  *1.7  18.5  1.5
Inflation (log)  3.86  **2.2  2.93  1.3  3.63  1.6  3.85  *1.7  5.36  **2.1  4.52  *1.9
Institutions  -3.19  0.8  -0.11  0.6  -0.15  0.0  -4.17  1.0  2.19  0.5
Transition  16.0  ***3.0  16.3  ***3.0  12.7  0.0  11.3  **2.1  1.83  0.3  14.8  ***2.7
Institutions x Transn  -8.91  *1.9  -6.67  1.3  -13.7  *1.9
Legal protections  12.3  **2.4  11.7  **2.3  16.5  **2.2  15.8  **2.5  16.8  ***2.7
Inflat Targeting  -10.8  *1.9  -9.42  1.5  -9.54  ***2.7  -8.02  1.0  -8.32  1.0
GDP-hedge  -2.61  1.2  -4.58  0.9  -7.09  1.4  -4.46  0.9
GDP-hdg x Transn  7.89  0.8  13.8  1.6  7.44  0.9
R-squared / NOBS  0.490  74  0.494  74  0.504  59  0.510  59  0.426  60  0.529  59
Adjusted R-squared  0.436  0.432  0.425  0.420  0.349  0.431
S.E. of regression  17.5  17.6  17.0  17.0  17.9  16.9
Log likelihood  -312.6  -312.3  -245.9  -245.5  -253.9  -261.0
***, *,  and * indicate  significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, respectively.Table 2-C. Cross-sectional  Determinants of Dollarization
(Dependent Variable:  Calculated Trend Dollarization)
Equation:  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  30.4  ***9.0  49.9  ***9.6  44.8  ***7.7  40.8  ***5.3  31.6  ***3.8  34.0  ***4.1
Restrictions on doll  -5.77  ***3.3  -5.26  ***3.8  -6.47  ***4.0  -6.90  ***4.3  -5.98  ***3.8  -6.70  ***4.3
Min. var. portfolio  40.8  ***3.5  29.4  **2.5  29.2  **2.1  25.7  *1.8  26.8  **2.0  24.3  *1.8
Inflation  (log)  7.96  ***4.4  4.98  **2.2  3.97  1.5  2.92  1.1  3.17  1.2
Institutions  -8.14  **2.1  -9.23  **2.3  -8.38  **2.2  -6.16  1.5
Transition  8.26  1.4  15.0  **2.4  14.7  **2.5
Legal protections  11.2  **2.0  11.3  **2.1
Inflat Targeting  -10.1  1.6
R-squared/NOBS  0.184  84  0.381  77  0.409  75  0.429  75  0.457  75  0.477  74
Adjusted R-squared  0.163  0.355  0.375  0.387  0.409  0.422
S.E. of regression  22.7  20.1  19.9  19.7  19.3  19.2
Log likelihood  -380.0  -338.2  -328.0  -326.7  -324.8  -319.5
Equation:  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.10  1.11  1.12
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  36.4  ***4.6  34.2  ***4.1  35.7  ***4.0  36.5  ***4.1  48.5  ***6.1  38.0  ***4.3
Restrictions on doll  -6.26  ***4.0  -6.72  ***4.3  -5.56  ***3.7  -5.57  ***3.7  -5.83  ***3.4  -5.21  ***3.5
Min. var. portfolio  25.2  **2.0  24.3  *1.9  18.2  1.4  19.0  1.4  19.6  1.4  14.8  1.2
Inflation (log)  4.76  **2.1  3.48  1.4  3.88  1.4  4.03  1.5  5.64  *1.9  4.95  *1.8
Institutions  -4.40  1.0  -1.82  0.4  -1.84  0.4  -6.04  1.4  1.37  0.3
Transition  14.8  **2.5  15.2  **2.5  11.9  **2.0  10.9  *1.9  1.16  0.2  15.8  ***3.0
Institutions x Transn  -11.5  **2.2  -8.41  1.4  -18.8  ***3.0
Legal protections  12.8  **2.3  12.0  **2.2  16.7  **2.5  16.2  **2.3  17.6  **2.5
Inflat Targeting  -12.1  **2.0  -10.2  1.6  -10.7  1.3  -9.73  1.1  10.1  1.2
GDP-hedge  -3.33  0.7  -7.64  1.3  -4.49  0.8
GDP-hdg x Transn  12.44  1.3  4.69  0.5
R-squared / NOBS  0.478  74  0.485  74  0.492  59  0.494  59  0.423  60  0.524  59
Adjusted R-squared  0.422  0.422  0.411  0.401  0.345  0.425
S.E. of regression  19.2  19.2  18.8  19.0  19.7  18.6
Log likelihood  -319.5  -318.9  -251.9  -251.8  -259.6  -250.0
***,  **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%  levels, respectively.- 19-
Inclusion of the inflation rate (in log form) substantially improves the fit of the simplest
regressions  (regression  1.2). The estimated coefficient implies that a doubling of inflation
increases dollarization  by about 5 percentage points. Yet, it loses significance  as structural
and institutional proxies for credibility effects are added in, suggesting both that credibility
effects are important and that credibility (and inflation) have important structural and
institutional underlying determinants. In particular, regression  1.3 shows that the unweighted
normalized  mean of the six institutional quality variables of KKZ has the predicted sign. An
improvement of one standard deviation  in institutional quality lowers fitted dollarization by
almost  10 percentage points.  To the extent countries with weaker institutions are more likely
to engage in government bail outs, the significance of institutional  variables can be viewed as
providing indirect support to the moral hazard interpretation  of dollarization.  All in all, this
equation states that almost half of the cross-country variation in dollarization rates is
explained by country differences  in institutional quality, regulatory frameworks,  and the
macroeconomic  environment.  Inclusion of other variables, including the transition and
inflation targeting dummies, and the GDP hedge variable,  finds correct signs and marginally
significant individual coefficients, but without much significant improvement  in the overall
fit of the equation.23
As noted, the increase  in dollarization  experienced by many countries appears puzzling when
viewed exclusively in light of the dynamics of inflation. While the relatively short time span
of our sample limits the scope for a full-fledged  intertemporal analysis (further work is
clearly needed to fully explore dollarization dynamics)  a simple regression of dollarization
dynamics, measured  as the difference between 2001  dollarization and average dollarization,
yields interesting and plausible results (Table 3). In particular,  increases in observed
dollarization are partly explained by increases  in warranted dollarization.  In view of the
declining inflation, this seems to be consistent with a "fear of floating" interpretation,
i.e., warranted dollarization  rose because the volatility of the exchange rate fell even more
than that of inflation.  Increases in trade are also significant, suggesting that globalization may
partly be responsible for the general upward trend in dollarization (albeit not the cross-
country differences).  Finally, dollarization  trends appear to have been affected by the level
(not the rate of change) of institutional quality and regulatory restrictions, suggesting the
existence of complex dynamic interactions.
Table 3. Changes in Dollarization
Dependent  Adj.  Countries
Variable  Constant  RESTR  INST  DTO  DMVP  R2  R2
DDOLL  **4.28  **-1.78  **-3.95  **0.16  **4.75  0.24  0.19  62
t-stat  (3.37)  (-2.25)  (-3.05)  (2.12)  (2.51)
Notes: DDOLL is the difference between 2001  dollarization  and average dollarization, RESTR is the
indicator of restrictions on dollarization, INST is the unweighted index of KKZ institutional quality
indicators, DTO is the change  in an indicator of trade openness, and DMVP is the change in the
minimum variance portfolio measures between  1995  and 2001.  ** and * indicate significance at the
5%  and 10%  levels, respectively.
23 Note that because of varying availability of data, the sample size varies, depending on the additional
explanatory  variables included, complicating the comparison of fit. Nevertheless, regression 1.6, including the
transition and inflation targeting dummies and the legal protections  variable is preferred to any of the others
1.3 to  1.8 by a log-likelihood ratio test at the 95 per cent level. At the stricter 99 per cent level, the inclusion of
further variables beyond the three  in regression  1.3 would not be justified.- 20 -
IV.  HAS DOLLARIZATION  PROMOTED FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT?
No study has so far attempted to assess directly the impact of dollarization on financial
deepening.24 Intuitively, it seems that allowing dollarization should help keep more of
financial  intermediation onshore, by offering depositors  an inflationary hedge. After all, the
empirical  evidence that inflation damages financial sector development  is quite convincing.25
Generally speaking, it may be taken as a rough rule of thumb that monetary depth increases
by about 3 percentage points for every $1,000 increase in GDP per capita and by about a
quarter of a percentage point every year, but falls by about half a percentage point for every
percentage point rise in the medium-term inflation rate (World Bank, 2001).
In particular,  a recent study by Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) looks closely at the cross-
country long-term determinants of financial depth and other measures of financial  sector
development focusing on the role of inflation.  In addition to inflation, they include as
controls the level of GDP per capita, the level of schooling (to measure overall economic
development),  a count of the number of revolutions and coups (to measure political stability),
the black market premium on foreign exchange (an indicator of price distortions),  and the
ratio of central government expenditure  to GDP.26 Despite the inclusion of these control
variables (not all of which prove to be significant),  the average  inflation rate in 1960-95 is
found to be strongly negatively correlated  with the average level of financial depth over the
same period.27
More direct evidence  on the impact of dollarization on financial  development  carr be inferred
from the negative experience of countries that have undertaken  a forced conversion of dollar
deposits into local currency, including Mexico and Bolivia in  1982 and Peru in 1985. As
documented  in Savastano  (1996) and Balifio  et al. (1999),  the highlight of these experiences
was a brutal contraction of onshore domestic intermediation.  In Bolivia and Peru,
intermediation only recovered once dollar deposits were reallowed.28 Similar evidence can be
derived from the experience of some countries that have repressed the use of the dollar and
have not actively developed alternative  indexation mechanisms  (such as Ecuador, Guatemala,
and Costa Rica). Faced with the regulatory and supervisory distortions resulting from the
very rapid growth of offshore banking intermediation,  most of these countries were led
eventually to liberalize their regulations on foreign exchange deposits.
24 Honohan and Shi (2003) did examine the effects  on interest rate spreads and on the ratio of local loans to
deposits.
25  While inflation volatility should also be included in an analysis of financial deepening, the level and variance
of inflation tend to be highly correlated in practice, whether on a cross-country  or time series basis, which
makes it quite difficult to disentangle their relative importance.
26 They do not include measures of legal rights and accounting  quality, found to be very important determinants
of financial depth in Beck, Loayza  and Levine (2000), though that paper does not include  inflation among the
explanatory variables.  See also Bordo  and Jonung (1993).
27 Similar evidence  for the bond market is reported by Burger and Wamock (2003)  who find that the level and
volatility of inflation play an important role in explaining the development of local currency bond markets.
28 In Mexico,  banking intermediation recovered during  1988-94 as the exchange  rate anchor and steady
appreciation increased the attractiveness  of  peso instruments.  However, the recovery proved to be ultimately
unsustainable  and the tequila crisis was followed by a prolonged period of renewed stagnation.- 21 -
An econometric  assessment of the impact of dollarization on financial development requires
attention to endogeneity, as many of the factors influential for monetary depth are also
among the determinants of dollarization.29 Indeed, coexistence of financial shallowness and
dollarization could be reflections of the same macroeconomic events rather than being
causally linked. In this context, it is not very surprising that adding dollarization to log
inflation in a simple cross-sectional least squares regression of financial depth, measured
as share of M2 to GDP, yields a negative coefficient (Regression 2.1  in Table 4)3°
(Regression  2.9).
For high inflation countries, however, more dollarization is associated with deeper financial
systems. An interaction  term between dollarization and inflation has a strongly significant
positive coefficient  (equation 2.2), implying that dollarization has the effect of moderating
the adverse effect of inflation on financial depth, exactly what theory predicts.3 It is
important to note that this effect is robust to estimation by two-stage least squares where the
actual level of dollarization is substituted by its predicted value using institutional and other
instruments (including the administrative restrictions on dollarization) (equation 2.3).32
GMM estimation also confirms the effect (equations 2.7 and 2.8). Including the level of
dollarization as well as the interaction term gives similar results (equations 2.10-2.15).33
Thus even though dollarization may have little impact on monetary depth where risk factors
summarized by inflation are low, our regression results show that, where inflation is high,
dollarization allows an economy to retain more monetary depth than it otherwise would.
29 While we  limit our testing to quantitative rather than "qualitative" measures, dollarization may also
contribute to improve the depth and quality of financial  intermediation.  In particular,  the average maturity of
dollar loan contracts is generally longer than that of local currency contracts.  At the same time, bank spreads on
dollar intermediation  are generally narrower than those on local currency intermediation (see Barajas and
Morales, 2003). Formal testing of such effects is hampered by the limited data availability and the need to sort
out endogenous market segmentation effects  associated with currency denomination.
30 Somewhat surprisingly,  though, the same result is obtained by an instrumental variable method that includes
as instruments the main underlying determinants of dollarization (regulatory, macroeconomic or institutional).
3  1The threshold level of yearly inflation beyond which dollarization deepens financial  intermediation  is in the
20-30 percent range.
32 The level of income per capita-a standard variable in such a context,  is also significant  (equation 2.5),
though collinear when included along with institutional quality variables which are also significant when
included separately (equation 2.4). The outliers Hong Kong SAR and Lebanon are excluded in these
regressions; if they are included,  the main effect is preserved as long as a dummy for offshore centers is
included (equation  2.6). The results shown for the average sample period dollarization are confirmed  when this
is replaced by the actual or computed period end dollarization (not reported).
33  Although the sign of the dollarization term is positive and significant  in the GMM estimate, the overall effect
of an increase  in dollarization on financial depth continues to be negative for low levels of inflation as the
interaction term (which is negative  due to a negative  log of inflation) dominates the dollarization  term.Table 4. Determinants  of Monetary Depth
Equation:  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8
Variable  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff. t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic
Constant  0.335  ***4.9  0.234  ***5.6  0.243  ***5.1  0.286  ***5.6  0.141  **2.2  0.137  1.5  0.301  ***9.4  0.133  ***3.8
Doll  -0.280  **2.5
Doll x  Log (inflat)  0.144  ***3.7  0.174  ***2.9  0.175  ***3.0  0.162  ***3.3  0.212  ***2.7  0.132  ***3.2  0.167  ***6.0
Log (Inflation)  -0.075  ***4.1  -0.116  ***7.1  -0.117  ***4.5  -0.101  ***3.8  -0.129  ***4.7  -0.156  ***4.0  -0.054  **2.3  -0.106  ***5.4
Government  0.082  **2.0  0.108  ***3.9
GNP/cap  0.233  ***2.9  0.141  1.1  0.258  ***6.7
Offshore center?  0.786  ***4.7
Instruments  A  B  B  A  B
Countries and areas  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN  HKG,LBN
omitted
R-squared/NOBS  0.387  69  0.444  69  0.315  47  0.372  47  0.477  42  0.474  43  0.262  47  0.428  42
Adjusted R-squared  0.368  0.427  0.283  0.328  0.436  0.419  0.211  0.383
S.E. of regression  0.194  0.185  0.164  0.159  0.148  0.208  0.173  0.154
Log likelihood/Method  16.8  OLS  20.2  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  GMM  GMM
Equation:  2.9  2.10  2.11  2.12  2.13  2.14  2.15
Variable  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic  Coeff.  t-Statistic
Constant  0.373  ***43  0.166  *1.9  0.088  0.6  0.146  1.0  -0.067  0.5  0.045  0.2  -0.060  1.1
Doll  -0.296  *2.0  0.167  0.9  0.345  1.1  0.309  1.1  0.467  *1.7  0.424  1.0  0.516  ***42
Doll x Log (inflat)  0.195  ***2.7  0.301  **2.4  0.288  **2.4  0.346  ***3.0  0.366  **2.1  0.328  ***5.4  tk
Log (nflation)  -0.051  **2.1  -0.135  ***4.8  -0.173  ***3.1  -0.152  ***2.8  -0.204  ***3.8  -0.226  ***2.9  -0.179  ***5.3
Government  0.079  *1.9
GNP/cap  0.227  ***2.9  0.126  1.1  0.246  ***6.3
Offshore center?  0.753  ***4.3
Instruments  A  B  B  B
Countries  omitted  HKG, LBN  HKGLBN  HKG, LBN  HKG, LBN  HKG, LBN  HKG, LBN
R-squared/NOBS  0.230  47  0.450  69  0.349  47  0.403  47  0.511  42  0.477  43  0.517  42
Adjusted  R-squared  0.195  0.425  0.304  0.346  0.458  0.407  0.465
S.E. of regression  0.175  0.185  0.162  0.157  0.145  0.210  0.144
Log likelihood/Method  2SLS  20.6  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS  GMM
Notes:  Dependent variable:  M2/GDP.
Instruments:  Set A= Institutions, Polstab, Regqual, Voice, Corrupt, Legorigf, Trans,  log(Inflation), Maxerate, Offcenter, Offshoredeps, Restrict(i),  Min. Var. Portfolio;
Set B=Set A + Gnppcppp.  Note that instruments  are not available for all countries.
Note: Doll x inflat means: Dollarization average x log (inflation) (coeff is multiplied by  100).
***, **,  and * indicate  significance  at the 1%, 5%, and  10% levels,  respectively.- 23  -
V.  ARE DOLLARIZED  FINANCIAL SYSTEMS  INHERENTLY FRAGILE?
Financially dollarized systems have been conspicuous  among recent high-profile financial
crises. The Mexican  1982 "mex-dollar"  crisis was  an early illustration of such events.34
There were a number of similar more recent episodes, particularly in Asia, Southern
America, and Eastern Europe. The 2002 Argentina financial  crisis and its ripple effects on
its highly dollarized neighbors brought home the realization that domestic dollarization can
greatly increase the fragility of financial systems.
Dollarized financial systems are exposed to both solvency and liquidity risks.  As regards
solvency,  the main risk results from currency mismatches  in the event of large
depreciations.  Currency mismatches can affect banks' balance sheet directly, or indirectly
by undermining the quality of their dollar loan portfolio.  In view of the tight regulatory
limits generally applied to banks' open foreign exchange positions, it is mainly through its
indirect effect on credit risk that use of dollars generates  vulnerability.35  Banks with large
domestic dollar liabilities must balance their foreign exchange positions by either extending
dollar lending to local currency earners or holding dollar assets abroad. To maintain their
profitability and satisfy the pent-up demand for loans, they end up on-lending domestically
a large share of their dollar deposits (Honohan and Shi, 2003), effectively transferring the
currency risk to their unhedged clients and retaining the resulting credit risk.
The scope for currency mismatch  is exacerbated by the wedge between financial and real
dollarization. When most prices  and wages continue to be set in local currency while
financial dollarization is widespread, real and financial  transactions  are effectively made in
different currencies. Thus, large depreciations can have catastrophic  effects. Nor is this
wedge limited to the private sector.  A similar wedge may affect governments whose tax
revenue is in local currency but that borrow in foreign currency to limit short-run debt-
servicing costs or signal their commitment to a stable exchange rate. When the domestic
banking system holds large claims against the government, public sector insolvency can
thus immediately lead to banking insolvency. Moreover,  as stressed in the balance sheet
literature, currency mismatches in the event of large depreciations have broad macro-
systemic  ripple effects, particularly in terms of output losses, that compound the
deterioration of banks' financial situation.
Systemic risk can also lead to the emergence of a risk premium on dollar deposits in local
banks, to the extent that depositors fear that the banks may not be able to provide external
dollar liquidity on demand in the event of a currency crisis. It is as if "local dollars," in the
form of deposits at local banks, are a different currency to U.S. dollar deposits held offshore
in the United States or a credible financial  center. Yet, in the case of a drop in confidence
34 The Mexican  1982 crisis was triggered by an apparent loss of macroeconomic  control,  with a rapidly
expanding fiscal deficit and public debt, and weak and confusing monetary and exchange rate management.  The
large claims of commercial banks on the government introduced a direct channel of transmission from fiscal
insolvency to bank insolvency.  A very similar sequence of events took place in Argentina during the more
recent crisis.
35  However, as documented by Garber (1996) in the case of Mexico,  regulatory limits on banks'  open positions
are not always effective,  however, as banks' positions in derivatives  may be misreported.-24  -
leading to a flight to the U.S. dollar and a run on banks, banks need to pay off their dollar
liabilities falling due at par. In the absence of an asset price adjustment that restore
equilibrium through an exchange rate overshoot (as would be the case for local currency
deposits), convertibility may not be sustainable  or credible unless liquid dollar liabilities are
backed by sufficient liquid dollar assets abroad. Instead, banks may run out of dollar liquid
reserves  and central banks of international  reserves to provide dollar liquidity support.3
When this happens, deposit contracts may need to be broken and disruptive or confiscatory
measures  taken, thereby validating creditors'  fears and justifying the run.
Liquidity and solvency crises are clearly interrelated. By undermining the solvency of
borrowers  and banks, the credit risk deriving from a large devaluation heightens  the risk of
deposit withdrawals by concerned depositors, whether in anticipation of or as a reaction to
the devaluation.
To test for the existence of dollarization-specific vulnerabilities, we run cross-country
regressions of banks'  exposure to solvency and liquidity risk on dollarization.  We used a
semi-log specification to allow for nonlinearities,  controlled for changes  in underlying
macro volatility, and used a standard instrumental variable method to control for potential
reverse causality. As regards solvency risk, we consider two measures: the Z-index (Z)
computed with 1995-2000 data, and the 2001 ratio of the nonperforming  loans to total loans
(NPL).38 As controls for macroeconomic volatility, we use the MVP determinants of
dollarization taken individually.  Results show that the deposit dollarization ratio has a clear
negative impact on both solvency proxies39 (Table 5).
36 While under a floating exchange rate regime, central banks could in principle provide liquidity support in
local currency against dollar deposit withdrawals,  the impact on the exchange  rate of such support is likely to be
explosive, unless dollar deposits are converted at a fixed exchange rate (i.e., the terms of deposit contracts are
not respected).
37 Nonlinearities  arise from the boundedness of the dollarization variable, that is a percentage. Linear
specifications yield the same qualitative  results, but their explanatory power is significantly lower than semi-log
specifications.
38 The Z index is a proxy of the probability of insolvency of a firm germane to measures of "distance to
default." It measures systemic risk potential when aggregated  for a set of systemically important banks. It is
defined as the ratio (ROA+K)/S,  where ROA is the return on assets, K is the equity capital-to-asset  ratio, and S
is  the standard deviation of returns on assets. Thus, a larger value of Z indicates a smaller risk profile, which
can be attained by improving  efficiency (increasing ROA), greater diversification (decreasing  S), or lower
leverage (increasing K) (see, for example, De Nicol6 (2000) and De Nicol6 et al., (2003)). The Z-index data are
taken from De Nicol6 et al., (2003).
39Arteta (2003) finds that the probability of a banking crisis is not significantly  affected by dollarization.
However,  his sample, as well as his methodology, are not comparable with ours.- 25  -
Table 5. Dollarization and Solvency Indicators
Panel  A
Dependent variable:  Natural  Lgarithm ofZ-index
Variable  Coeff. t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  **1.26  7.8  **1.24  6.7  **1.38  6.5  **1.32  5.8
Average doll  **-0.01  -2.0  **-0.01  -2.1  **-0.01  -2.0  *-0.02  1.9
INFV  -0.03  -0.2  -0.01  -0.8
RERV  --0.12  -0.4  0.13  0.4
corr(INF,RER)  0.16  1.0  0.14  0.9
R-squared/NOBS  0.054  58  0.111  49  0.052  56  0.101  66
Adjusted R-squared  0.037  0.030  0.035  0.002
Method  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS
Panel  B
Dependent variable:  Natural  Logarithm of  NPL ratio
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  **1.62  7.8  **1.39  6.7  **1.13  3.8  **1.08  3.5
Average  doll  **0.02  3.4  **0.02  3.7  **0.03  3.9  **0.03  3.1
INFV  **-0.02  -3.2  **-0.14  -3.1
RERV  **0.35  3.5  **0.23  2.4
corr(INF,RER)  -14.0  -0.7  -6.88  -0.4
R-squared/NOBS  0.143  63  0.235  54  0.281  62  0.286  53
Adjusted R-squared  0.129  0.173  0.269  0.226
Method  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS
Notes: Average  doll is the  1990-2001 average foreign deposit to total deposit ratio. INFV is inflation
volatility,  RERV is real exchange rate volatility,  and corr(INFV,RER)  is the correlation of inflation
and the real exchange rate, computed  on quarterly data for the 1995-2001  period. The coefficients of
IFV, RERV and corr(INF,RER)  are multiplied by 100.  Instruments in the 2SLS regressions are: a
constant, transition, restrict,  Voice, Govteff, Polstab,  Regqual, and Corrupt.  ** and * indicate
significance at the 5% and  10% level respectively.
We then run similar regressions for liquidity risk, based on the correlation between deposit
growth volatility (measured as the standard deviation of total deposit growth, computed with
yearly data over the period 1990-2001) and deposit dollarization.  Deposit dollarization  is also
found to increase deposit volatility (Table 6).
Table 6. Dollarization and Deposit Volatility
Dependent variable:  Natural  logarithm of deposit growth volatility
Variable  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat  Coeff.  t-Stat
Constant  **2.09  13.4  **1.96  11.9  **1.51  6.4  **1.67  7.3
Average doll  **0.03  5.1  **0.03  4.7  **0.05  6.4  **0.04  4.8
LNFV  **0.04  2.0  **0.13  2.3
RERV  *0.04  1.7  **0.14  6.5
corr(INF,RER)  -11.72  -0.9  -8.99  -0.6
R-squared / NOBS  0.288  96  0.381  77  0.328  84  0.495  66
Adjusted R-squared  0.281  0.355  0.320  0.461
Method  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS
Notes: Average doll is the  1990-2001  average foreign deposit to total deposit ratio. INFV is inflation
volatility,  RERV is real exchange rate volatility,  and corr(INFV,RER) is the correlation of inflation
and the real exchange rate, computed on quarterly data for the 1995-2001  period. The coefficients of
IFV, RERV and corr(INF,RER)  are multiplied by 100. Instruments  in the 2SLS regressions  are: a
constant, transition,  restrict, Voice, Govteff, Polstab, Regqual, and Corrupt.  ** and * indicate
significance at the 5% and  10% levels,  respectively.- 26 -
While the majority of dollarization-related  crises in dollarized financial systems has so far
taken place in a number of Latin American and transition economies it is worth noting that
dollar intermediation  appears to be much deeper and more deeply ingrained in Latin
America than in other parts of the world. The ratio of foreign currency deposits to GDP is
substantially higher than in Latin America than in transition economies  or (non Latin
American)  low-income countries (Table 7). Similarly, a much higher proportion of dollar
deposits is onlent locally rather than held abroad. At the same time, the public holds a much
higher fraction of its dollar deposits at home rather than abroad.40
When combined with a higher degree of capital account openness and exposure to capital
flows, it is not hard to imagine why dollarized Latin American  countries could be more
exposed to recurrent financial instability. In particular, liquidity risk is likely to be less of an
issue in countries where local dollar deposits are small in absolute magnitude and more
distant substitutes for assets held abroad or under the mattress.  In addition, both liquidity
risk and solvency risk are clearly more limited when a large fraction of foreign currency
deposits is held abroad rather than onlent locally. This also suggests, however, that the
exposure to financial fragilities could even out over time throughout the world as dollar
intermediation  deepens and countries'  capital accounts open up.
Table 7. Indicators of Domestic Dollar Financial Intermediation:  2001
(in percent)
Foreign  Foreign  Cross-border
Currency  Assets to  Deposits to
Deposits to  Foreign  Foreign
GDP  Currency  Currency
Deposits  Deposits
Latin America  1/  21.1  53.7  124.0
Transition economies 2/  8.8  104.1  130.9
Low income 3/  7.8  260.7  472.1
1/ Includes  15  South and Central American countries.
2/ Includes 23 transition economies.
3/ Includes  13 African and 12 Asian countries.
VI.  THE CASE FOR PRUDENTIAL ACTIVISM
Despite the added systemic fragility, it does not necessarily follow that prudential  regulation
should be tightened.4 Only if the fragility of dollarized financial  systems can be traced to
heightened and hitherto unrecognized externalities  would that be the case. As discussed in
40 While data limitations restrict the scope for similar cross-country  comparisons of dollar cash holdings, there
are indications that these are particularly important in many of the transition economies (see Havrylyshyn and
Beddies (2002)).
41  No specific guidelines  have so far been issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision on how to
counteract risk exposure by banks and their customers in dollarized economies.  Instead, supervisors have
substantial discretion as to how to address these risks.- 27 -
Section III, dollarization  itself largely arises as protection  against risk and, absent
externalities and moral hazard, does not call for prudential reform. A case for imposing
tighter, currency-specific,  prudential requirements  to limit the risks of dollarization would
thus have to be based on a finding that the level of dollarization, though privately optimal,
was socially excessive.
The presence of moral hazard is particularly clear, as the systemwide nature of the risks
related to dollarization  creates a herd-effect in regard to indirect  exchange rate risk arising
through increased credit risk on foreign currency lending. Bank depositors that expect to be
bailed out in the event of a catastrophic exchange rate depreciation will not require banks that
lend in foreign currency to local currency earners pay a risk premium on their deposits. This,
in turn, removes banks'  incentives  to limit the risk they take by intermediating  in dollars or
adequately provisioning against those risks. Instead, they are better off not to provision since
it allows them to limit their losses in the event of a catastrophic  depreciation (e.g.,  it
enhances the option value of walking away). Bailout expectations similarly induce dollar
borrowers to discount the real cost and risks of dollar borrowing.  By penalizing the more
prudent banks, competitive forces can help broaden across all banks the failure of at least
some of the participants to fully internalize risk. Instead, the owners and other insiders of a
bank which experiences  widespread loan-losses associated with an exchange rate collapse
can expect much more favorable treatment from the authorities  in the crisis resolution phase
if it has been in the company of many other banks  facing the same risk. Knowing this,
bankers will assume indirect credit risk more freely than they would in isolation.
Similar moral hazard failures  affect banks' exposure to liquidity risk. The large international
reserves held by central banks and abundant associated provision of liquidity support in the
event of systemic runs provide free insurance benefits. Thus, banks have limited incentives to
accumulate dollar liquidity on their own, if they know that all banks will be similarly affected
and, hence, will need to be supported.42 Instead, competitive pressures will tend to penalize
those banks that set aside more liquidity or otherwise take measures to limit the liquidity of
their liabilities.
Thus, a first objective of prudential reform is to level the playing field between the local
currency and the foreign currency by ensuring that market participants adequately internalize
dollarization risks. A secondary objective is to boost the capacity of dollarized financial
systems to withstand liquidity or solvency shocks, thereby enhancing the scope for a more
flexible and smoother monetary and foreign exchange policy. However,  it should do so
without unduly constrainingfinancial  development and repressing  the needfor currency
diversification.  This latter objective is likely to gain importance as financial  systems across
the world deepen and become more integrated.
Provided the necessary information  and skills are available, a flexible regulatory approach,
based on statistical risk management models such as value-at-risk, should thus be preferable
to one based on discretionary application of administrative restrictions and quantitative
42 Gonzalez-Eiras (2000) provides direct evidence of such effects.  He finds that the introduction in Argentina of
a credit contingent  line to expand liquidity support to banks led domestic banks to reduce  their domestic
liquidity relative to foreign banks (that were less dependent on such support due to their increased reliance  on
support from parent banks).- 28 -
limits.  Such an approach would avoid thwarting sound risk management by banks and limit
the scope for regulatory distortions on portfolio  diversification.
In undeveloped market environments, tighter prudential requirements on foreign currency
loans might have to be based on simple rules of thumb such as ceilings  on gross as well  as
net foreign exchange exposure, rather than trying to rely on sophisticated risk calculations
(Honohan and Stiglitz, 2001). In more sophisticated markets the requirements  could take the
form of specific reserves proportional  to the excess value-at-risk  assumed by a bank when
denominating loans to unhedged borrowers in foreign currency rather than in local currency.
The definition of an appropriate value-at-risk cutoff would need to be based on a
macroeconomic  and statistical analysis of shocks and needed exchange rate responses. In
view of the macro-systemic nature of such simulations,  a first pillar-type  approach (i.e., a
specific capital charge) might be needed in many (if not most) cases. However, to ease the
impact on the banking system of a large depreciation  and limit the potential  for a credit
crunch, it would be preferable that these reserves not be part of the regular capital adequacy
requirements.  Instead, flexibility should be allowed to draw down the reserves in times of
need and gradually rebuild them once used.43
As regards liquidity risk, regulations should similarly aim at letting banks bear the full risk
(and cost) of assuming liquid dollar liabilities.  Currency-specific  liquidity requirements that
require that banks back their most liquid dollar liabilities against liquid dollar assets abroad
(or at the central bank) seem to provide a suitable mechanism for internalizing such risks. In
the case of branches of foreign banks,  strong, legally binding assurances of support from
parent banks might be acceptable  in lieu of liquid reserves when the parent meet appropriate
criteria, such as high ratings by international rating agencies and sufficient size in relation to
their local branch. By adjusting the policy response to the underlying risk, this should limit
the overall regulatory burden on the banking system and hence be less constraining to its
development capacity.44
VII.  THE CASE FOR MONETARY REFORM
In discussing the case for monetary reform, the first point worth recalling from Section II is
that increased dollarization has often coincided in recent years with lower inflation. Indeed,
with a few exceptions, most highly dollarized economies have demonstrated in recent years a
fairly reasonable  stabilization record, down in many cases to the single digit level. Thus,
setting aside issues of credibility and sustainability, from a pure stabilization  perspective  it
can be argued that financial dollarization has not generally been a strong impediment against
an effective monetary policy.
43 In countries where deposit insurance premia are adjusted for risk, rates could also be differentiated  by
currency.
4However, by benefiting the branches of large international banks over indigenous banks, this could have
broader consequences  for the future of the banking  system that need to be carefully assessed.  An early
discussion of the potential benefits of expanded dollarization for foreign  banks can be found in Swoboda
(1968).- 29 -
That dollarized countries have achieved relatively low inflation levels is hardly surprising,
however,  in view of the fact that they have used the exchange rate as their key nominal
anchor. A more significant issue is whether dollarized countries can follow an independent
monetary policy, which indeed is unlikely when the exchange rate is used as life line. There
is good evidence that dollarized countries are more prone to "fear of floating" (Levy Yeyati,
Sturzenegger,  and Reggio, 2002). Due to lack of monetary credibility  and financial system
vulnerabilities  (as discussed above), the monetary authorities are concerned about the adverse
macroeconomic and financial impact of large exchange rate fluctuations.  But the more they
target the exchange rate, the less attractive the local currency becomes, and, hence, the more
dollarized the economy.  Such endogeneities provide a fertile ground for multiple equilibria
and adverse dynamics in which rising dollarization and exchange rate rigidities play back on
each other.45
A seemingly puzzling fact in this context is that many countries with high financial
dollarization continue to experience rather low real dollarization  in the sense of denominating
prices and wages in dollar terms (as shown in Section II, while the pass-through is correlated
with financial dollarization, it is comparatively much smaller in magnitude). As shown by Ize
and Parrado  (2002), this asymmetry can be explained based on the comparative attractiveness
of the local currency for denominating price and wage contracts.46 By enhancing real price
and wage flexibility, the local currency provides a better buffer against output or employment
fluctuations.  However, this is conditional  on monetary policy playing an active
countercyclical  role, which appears to be inconsistent with fear of floating.
This apparent disconnect between the monetary activism needed to maintain  a low real
dollarization and the fear of floating resulting from high financial dollarization disappears
once the discontinuous,  highly nonlinear nature of monetary policy in dollarized countries  is
taken into account. Even if central banks target the exchange rate under normal conditions,
they are ready to let go under exceptionally large shocks.  Indeed, as emphasized in Section
VI, the time inconsistency and moral hazard resulting from fear of floating is precisely what
exacerbates  financial dollarization.  In contrast, the rainy-day benefits of  retaining  the local
currency (the exchange rate is expected to depreciate under exceptionally large shocks that
call for major real exchange rate realignments) is what maintains the attractiveness of the
local currency  for real contracts, i.e., maintains real dollarization  in check.
Recent experiences support this interpretation.  Both the Asian and Southern  American
countries with high financial dollarization (including Argentina) have experienced in recent
years major nominal and real exchange  rate realignments  triggered by deepening regional
crises  and contagion effects.  The experience of the Southern American countries is
45 Ize and Parrado (2002) and Chamon and Hausmann (2002) develop models with multiple dollarization
equilibria, based on optimal endogenous monetary policy frameworks.
46 Ize and Parrado show that because  firms and workers  set their prices and wages in advance, real dollarization
should respond to similar factors as those affecting financial dollarization. In particular,  it should  reflect the
relative  volatilities of the local and foreign currencies.  Unlike financial dollarization,  however, real dollarization
should also reflect quantity uncertainty,  e.g., uncertainty about employment and output. Thus, denominating
price and wages in local currency is preferable if it provides a buffer against employment  or output fluctuations,
which should be the case if the monetary authority uses (or is expected to use) monetary policy
countercyclically.- 30 -
particularly revealing.  Faced with steep exchange rate depreciations  in neighboring countries,
several dollarized Southern Cone countries were faced with a painful choice between
maintaining their exchange rate and enduring trade and output pressures,  or letting their
exchange rate depreciate and enduring financial sector difficulties. In the event, they chose
the latter. The problem, therefore,  is not that monetary policy in highly dollarized economies
is ineffective.  Instead, the problem is the highly nonlinear way in which it operates, which
gives rise to enormous costs.
The first best approach out of this quandary is, of course, a clean policy break,  i.e., a switch
to a free float backed by a strong inflation anchor, such as through the adoption of full-
fledged inflation targeting. Targeting inflation instead of the exchange rate should lead to a
gradual process of de-dollarization  and limit the scope for catastrophic policy breaks.  The
change in policy regime should be accompanied by the simultaneous (gradual) adoption  of
prudential reforms to internalize and limit dollarization risks (as described in the previous
section) and measures to promote and facilitate the use of the local currency (such as efforts
to develop markets for local-currency-denominated  public securities, perhaps including
price-indexed  securities, and a strengthening of monetary management and payment services
in local currency). In some cases, these measures may need to be complemented by structural
and institutional measures (such as strengthening legal rights for creditors, the quality of
accounting,  and, more generally, the quality and accountability of government)  aiming at
consolidating expectations of respect by the government for private contracts.
While the inherent difficulties  in de-dollarizing should not be underestimated,  by providing a
consistent and transparent policy signal, such a comprehensive package of mutually
reinforcing measures, if sustained,  offer the best chances of success. Countries should over
time experience  a "virtuous cycle" in which de-dollarization enhances the scope for monetary
autonomy, leading in turn to a further decline of dollarization.
Nonetheless, the road to de-dollarization  and an independent monetary policy is unlikely to
be smooth and easy.47 To begin with, there might be limited political appetite in heavily
dollarized economies  for decoupling monetary policy from the dollar. In many cases, such an
approach may need to be gradual.  In particular,  the switch away from exchange rate targeting
may require  a careful step-by-step approac,h that initially limits the scope for large exchange
rate fluctuations while allowing for a gradual rebuilding of confidence.  However, due to time
inconsistency and moral hazard, maintaining  a steady course could be difficult and subjected
to potential  setbacks. Moreover, fiscal, institutional,  political, and technical constraints may
continue to undermine  the credibility and effectiveness of the central bank, even when a
suitable legal and operational  framework has been put in place. If so, letting go of the
exchange rate could further undermine the local currency and increase (rather than reduce)
dollarization.  Thus, in some cases, it might be preferable  to recognize at the outset that the
ultimate goal of restoring the credibility of the local currency as an independent  currency is
out of the country's reach.
47 Achieving full monetary independence  can, by itself, be a major undertaking.  Even emerging economies  with
limited dollarization and nominally floating exchange rates have had a difficult time using monetary policy for
counter-cyclical  purposes.- 31  -
Countries that cannot let go of the dollar are left with two options.  The first option,
maintaining a dual currency regime, only makes sense if it delivers  a usable degree of
monetary independence at a reasonable  cost. A tightening of prudential standards
(i.e., introducing solvency and liquidity buffers) can help achieve this goal by making the
financial system more robust and resilient (hence limiting the risks and costs of banking
crises)  and enhancing the scope for a more active monetary policy and flexible exchange
rate.
The second option is to fully dollarize.  By ensuring that the currency used for financial
transactions  is the same as that used for real transactions,  official dollarization  eliminates the
potential  for currency mismatches and depreciation-induced  systemic banking crises. At the
same time, by limiting both currency risk and country risk, it may reduce banks'  funding
costs and contain (but not eliminate) the risk of a liquidity crisis.49 However,  full
dollarization also introduces important financial vulnerabilities  by limiting the economy's
capacity to cope with shocks and magnifying output fluctuations.30
vm.  CONCLUSIONS
Whether financial authorities like it or not, foreign-currency-denominated  deposits represent
an alternative liquid asset that is to some degree everywhere attractive  to investors and bound
to acquire  increased relevance with globalization.  Some countries have outlawed the holding
of foreign currency deposits in onshore banks granting local currency an effective monopoly,
at least for onshore finance.  Such a strategy is especially unattractive for a country unable to
deliver macroeconomic  stability. Private agents are driven offshore in their search for a
hedge and financial development  is hindered. But it does not follow either that a dual
currency regime with high dollarization is the best feasible option. True, it can help retain
financial depth in the face of inflation, but getting inflation under control is a more
satisfactory way of promoting financial development. And the more dollarized the system,
the riskier it is.
The road to reducing dollarization and its risks should be based on a two-lane  approach that
both discourages the use of the dollar and enhances the attractiveness  of the local currency as
a medium of intermediation and. Thus, measures are needed to ensure that hidden
externalities  are properly internalized through an enhanced prudential environment.  In
addition, a credible commitment to price stability is clearly needed.  The monetary authorities
need to improve the quality of their product.  While it could be objected,  at least in the case of
48  The effectiveness  of monetary policy can also be enhanced through improving its transparency. Following the
example of inflation targeters,  even countries  that continue to use the rate of crawl as their main operational
instrument  (instead of the interest rate) would gain clarity by linking more systematically changes in  the
instrument  to the attainment of the policy goal.
49 See Berg and Borensztein (2000) and Powell and Sturzenegger  (2000).
50 Real  exchange rate adjustments  are likely to be needed, no matter what, in response to shocks. If these
adjustments  are not facilitated through nominal exchange rate adjustments, they will take place through price
adjustments  brought about by larger recessions. The resulting financial system stress could be more severe than
that incurred  under a flexible exchange rate system.- 32 -
already heavily dollarized economies, that they come too late in an already crowded
marketplace where the dollar has taken a dominant position, the counterargument  is that the
local currency should have a natural constituency in countries where monetary independence
makes sense. Because of its unique shock-buffering capacity, the local currency,  if well
managed,  should gain a high and stable market share.  However, policymakers should resist
the tendency to respond to high dollarization with a fear of floating that limits the benefits of
their currency and boosts instead dollarization.
The importance of institutional variables in explaining dollarization suggests that the policy
reform agenda should also include measures to strengthen the institutional environment and
send a clear signal that good policies are here to stay. In particular,  the government's
capacity and willingness to minimize the other risks of financial contracting  in local currency
should be of importance.  Aspects that could help create a favorable environment for
contracting include enforcement of adequate legal rights for creditors, quality of accounting,
political stability, relatively undistorted goods markets and the overall quality of government,
as has been shown by empirical studies of the determinants of financial depth more generally
(including those cited above). The relevance of institutional variables could also be
interpreted as sounding a note of caution, however, if viewed as a manifestation of deeply
rooted hindrances  to achieving monetary credibility. The degree of policy persistence and
consistency needed to remove these roadblocks  could be considerable in many cases.Table 1. Foreign Currency Deposits to Total Deposits
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  max  max-min  shape
Albania  na.  na.  na.  Na.  30.8  30.6  31.8  28.9  23.5  25.2  27.8  32.1  32.1  8.6  U
Angola  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  25.4  52.2  59.1  73.2  81.1  83.7  81.0  83.7  58.3
Antigua and Barbuda  5.0  5.5  5.5  3.7  4.6  3.8  4.3  5.5  5.5  5.6  7.3  5.7  7.3  3.5  D
Argentina  47.2  48.1  47.1  52.2  55.6  57.1  57.5  56.2  58.4  61.8  64.7  73.6  73.6  26.5
Armenia  na.  na.  na.  Na.  72.2  52.8  59.9  74.3  72.1  80.0  81.2  79.7  81.2  28.4  U
Austria  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  1.3  2.1  2.1  2.3  1.7  2.3  1.0  S
Azerbaijan  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  49.1  50.2  57.2  62.8  66.9  78.0  81.0  81.0.  31.9
Bahamas,  The  2.1  2.5  2.9  2.2  1.5  1.8  1.3  1.7  2.2  1.8  2.8  2.7  2.9  1.6  S
Bahrain  na.  39.7  34.7  38.8  41.3  42.2  40.6  39.1  na.  na.  na.  na.  42.2  7.5  E
Bangladesh  0.2  0.4  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  S
Barbados  3.5  3.3  4.1  5.7  9.6  15.8  11.7  17.5  11.9  9.7  6.4  6.9  17.5  14.2  H
Belarus  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  na.  63.9  53.5  69.4  66.0  69.4  15.9  E
Belize  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  2.3  2.4  2.1  2.7  1.9  1.9  2.7  0.8  S
Bhutan  na.  na.  na.  4.1  4.1  3.7  3.0  2.0  3.3  5.0  2.1  0.3  5.0  4.6  D
Bolivia  81.6  80.7  81.2  81.4  78.5  78.3  91.6  91.7  91.9  92.6  92.4  91.5  92.6  14.3
Bosnia-Herzegovina  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  85.6  86.3  88.8  63.8  54.6  62.5  88.8  34.1  D
Bulgaria  na.  38.4  29.1  23.0  35.8  29.5  53.3  53.4  53.2  52.6  54.3  57.2  57.2  34.2
Cambodia  na.  na.  na.  85.7  85.7  91.9  94.0  94.1  92.5  92.3  93.2  94.6  94.6  9.0  w
Chile  na.  na.  na.  Na.  6.5  5.0  3.6  3.5  5.8  8.5  9.0  10.7  10.7  7.2  U
China,P.R.:  Mainland  na.  na.  na.  Na  na.  na.  na.  na.  7.9  8.0  8.9  8.0  8.9  1.0  S
HongKong SAR  na.  59.6  58.8  55.2  53.5  49.5  45.0  44.0  44.0  45.5  47.1  45.0  59.6  15.6  D
Comoros  na.  na.  na.  Na  na.  na.  na.  na.  0.2  0.5  0.5  0.7  0.7  0.5  S
Congo, Dem. Rep. of  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  69.7  50.3  50.6  32.2  43.5  57.0  69.7  37.5  U
CostaRica  26.8  34.8  32.4  30.4  31.1  40.9  35.7  38.3  41.8  41.1  41.1  43.8  43.8  17.0  E
Croatia  na.  na.  na.  Na  59.3  66.6  67.6  68.9  73.8  73.6  71.1  71.2  73.8  14.5
Czech Republic  na.  na.  na.  9.0  8.0  6.3  7.1  12.7  12.7  13.4  13.2  12.5  13.4  7.1  U
Denrark  na.  2.2  2.8  3.0  3.3  3.3  3.6  3.2  3.2  4.1  4.4  4.7  4.7  2.4  S
Dominica  na.  2.7  3.4  3.1  2.4  2.4  1.2  2.1  2.6  2.7  2.6  3.2  3.4  2.2  S
Ecuador  13.3  14.5  20.0  16.9  15.6  19.2  22.3  23.6  36.9  53.7  53.7  53.7  53.7  40.4
Egypt  54.3  55.6  37.0  32.0  32.0  31.6  27.2  22.6  22.1  22.0  23.3  25.0  55.6  33.6  D
El Salvador  4.1  3.4  4.9  4.1  5.0  5.5  7.0  8.1  8.5  8.8  8.9  8.9  8.9  5.5
Estonia  na.  33.7  28.9  6.8  16.4  16.1  14.5  19.8  20.0  18.5  23.9  20.8  33.7  26.9  U
Finland  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  4.2  4.1  3.4  2.3  2.1  3.0  4.2  2.2  S
Georgia  na.  na.  na.  Na.  66.7  40.1  46.4  58.4  68.7  79.0  77.9  81.5  81.5  41.4  U
Ghana  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  25.6  29.2  30.6  22.8  29.7  30.8  na.  30.8  8.0  E
Greece  na.  na.  na.  Na.  22.7  24.1  22.6  29.5  35.2  30.9  29.8  19.6  35.2  15.6  H
Guatemala  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.1  5.1  5.1  5.1
Guinea  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  19.0  22.6  24.4  24.8  27.9  31.1  28.0  31.1  12.1Table 1. Foreign Currency Deposits to Total Deposits (Continued)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  max  max-min  shape
Guinea-Bissau  29.6  36.3  46.3  50.7  50.5  50.5  57.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  57.9  57.9
Haiti  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  29.6  30.6  33.8  39.1  42.5  42.5  12.9
Honduras  1.8  3.9  6.6  9.0  16.9  22.1  31.9  27.2  27.6  27.9  28.7  33.1  33.1  31.3
Hungary  na.  na.  18.4  23.5  24.7  30.5  27.0  24.6  23.9  22.0  21.8  20.5  30.5  12.1  H
Indonesia  na.  na.  18.2  19.7  20.1  19.7  19.4  28.3  22.2  19.4  20.8  20.1  28.3  10.0  H
Israel  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  18.0  20.5  19.3  18.7  18.5  20.5  2.4  S
Italy  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  3.0  3.9  4.0  3.9  4.2  na.  4.2  1.2  S
Jamaica  na.  na.  11.9  12.5  21.0  18.9  22.1  18.4  21.0  20.5  23.0  23.3  23.3  11.4
Japan  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  8.4  8.9  6.9  4.9  5.8  5.5  8.9  4.0  D
Kazakhstan  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  na.  36.4  46.5  50.3  56.9  56.9  20.5
Kenya  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  7.9  7.2  9.0  9.3  11.9  15.5  15.2  15.5  8.3
Korea  0.6  1.5  1.1  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.9  3.3  4.7  2.6  3.4  3.5  4.7  4.2
Kyrgyz Republic  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  32.9  33.0  41.0  63.4  61.7  66.1  65.1  66.1  33.2
Lao People's Dem. Rep.  17.8  10.5  67.0  49.1  49.7  57.3  54.4  65.9  76.3  89.6  84.9  82.7  89.6  79.2
Latvia  na.  na.  na.  40.5  39.6  50.4  52.5  50.7  43.8  46.1  45.2  43.9  52.5  12.9  H
Lebanon  na.  na.  na.  68.2  59.1  60.6  53.4  60.1  60.7  56.6  62.3  69.2  69.2  15.8
Lithuania  na.  na.  na.  62.7  38.8  40.6  38.2  32.6  36.4  43.8  45.7  46.6  62.7  30.1  U
Macedonia, FYR  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  55.5  56.7  51.4  55.2  65.4  65.4  14.0
Malawi  na.  na.  na.  Na.  20.6  10.8  11.3  14.6  31.2  16.9  22.0  14.6  31.2  20.4  E
Malaysia  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  0.9  1.8  2.3  2.5  3.3  3.7  3.7  2.8  S
Mexico  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  5.6  6.2  7.3  10.4  10.8  10.8  5.2
Moldova  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  20.3  19.3  43.8  49.6  48.8  48.0  49.6  30.3
Mongolia  na.  na.  na.  41.5  25.8  27.3  29.4  41.0  35.9  45.4  43.7  39.3  45.4  19.6  U
Mozambique  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  53.6  54.0  44.0  43.1  43.2  45.0  55.3  55.3  12.2  U
Netherlands  Antilles  18.3  20.3  19.7  19.0  18.8  20.5  17.8  17.1  16.1  17.0  16.3  17.7  20.5  4.4
Netherlands  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  3.9  4.0  4.0  4.7  4.1  4.7  0.8  S
New Zealand  5.6  4.8  3.5  4.2  2.8  2.8  4.5  3.2  4.7  2.7  3.4  3.1  5.6  2.9  S
Nicaragua  40.3  36.2  46.0  60.2  59.6  67.8  62.3  64.5  68.1  67.8  70.4  71.0  71.0  34.8
Nigeria  na.  na.  na.  Na.  1.2  4.1  2.6  2.1  3.0  7.4  5.4  5.0  7.4  6.2  E
Norway  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  4.1  4.0  3.6  3.4  3.5  na.  4.1  0.7  S
Paraguay  na.  na.  na.  43.4  40.4  37.9  46.6  51.8  59.7  62.5  62.2  66.9  66.9  29.0
Peru  45.5  62.9  66.4  70.4  66.3  64.8  67.7  63.8  63.8  65.7  68.3  66.0  70.4  24.9
Philippines  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  24.7  30.4  32.4  32.6  31.5  32.3  30.7  32.6  7.9
Poland  na.  35.3  33.8  40.2  39.0  27.6  22.6  22.7  18.6  18.9  17.5  18.9  40.2  22.7  D
Romania  3.6  3.7  18.4  36.2  27.2  26.9  27.7  33.3  37.1  43.1  46.8  49.0  49.0  45.4
Russia  na.  na.  na.  40.8  39.8  28.5  27.5  25.0  44.0  41.1  37.4  34.3  44.0  19.0  E
SioTome&Principe  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  38.7  42.7  46.4  51.5  51.1  49.6  44.4  51.5  12.8  H
Saudi Arabia  30.0  27.2  24.0  26.3  25.1  23.4  20.4  19.8  21.3  20.2  18.7  17.9  30.0  12.1  D  t1
Slovak Republic  na.  na.  na.  12.5  14.3  12.6  11.4  11.8  16.4  16.3  17.6  17.7  17.7  6.3  ZTable  1.  Foreign  Currency Deposits to Total Deposits (Continued)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  max  max-min  shape
Slovenia  na.  52.4  49.0  49.3  41.0  42.1  39.5  33.7  30.2  31.1  34.5  36.1  52.4  22.2  D
South Afiica  na.  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.5  0.7  1.5  2.3  3.5  3.5  4.2  6.2  6.2  6.0
Spain  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  1.8  2.2  1.9  1.7  1.8  1.5  2.2  0.7  S
St. Kitts and Nevis  16.4  14.6  14.7  17.1  13.3  21.3  19.0  23.6  25.5  21.2  32.7  30.3  32.7  19.4
St. Vincent&Grenadines  0.6  0.9  0.5  1.0  2.1  1.6  1.2  2.0  2.5  3.1.  1.5  1.2  3.1  2.6  S
Sweden  na.  na.  na.  Na.  1.8  1.0  0.9  1.6  1.3  1.8  2.1  1.1  2.1  1.2  S
Switzerland  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  na.  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.6  0.5  S
Tadjikistan  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  41.5  43.6  62.8  72.4  67.8  na.  72.4  30.9
Tanzania  na.  na.  na.  17.9  21.2  28.1  24.2  26.1  25.2  29.5  30.2  32.9  32.9  18.4  E
Thailand  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.4  1.3  1.1  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.4  1.3  S
Trinidad and Tobago  na.  na.  na.  9.2  16.6  18.3  21.5  24.3  24.1  25.5  27.8  24.4  27.8  18.6
Turkey  25.9  32.7  37.3  42.1  50.1  49.9  47.5  48.8  45.1  47.2  46.6  58.2  58.2  32.3
Turkmenistan  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  na.  33.0  30.9  30.1  na.  33.0  3.0  S
Uganda  na.  na.  na.  15.7  17.1  17.6  18.4  18.2  18.1  29.4  29.9  na.  29.9  14.2
Ukraine  na.  na.  10.6  25.0  42.2  36.8  30.4  25.8  39.1  43.7  38.4  32.4  43.7  33.2  E
United Arab Emirates  36.5  33.1  29.3  23.7  23.4  20.9  21.5  21.2  21.6  23.3  24.2  25.4  36.5  15.6  U
United Kingdom  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  8.9  13.5  13.3  12.7  15.1  16.6  16.6  7.7
Uruguay  na.  na.  na.  78.4  79.6  78.6  77.2  78.2  79.0  80.8  81.6  84.6  84.6  7.4
Uzbekistan  na.  na.  na.  Na.  na.  na.  na.  13.8  13.0  7.5  na.  na.  13.8  6.3  D
Venezuela, Rep.  Bol.  na.  na.  na.  Na.  0.1  na.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.4  S
Vietnam  na.  na.  44.9  42.0  41.8  34.6  32.1  34.1  36.6  40.5  41.2  43.4  44.9  12.8
Yemen, Republic of  na.  12.4  10.2  9.3  6.4  51.8  41.4  46.3  51.3  52.6  51.1  52.7  52.7  46.3  U
Zambia  na.  na.  na.  Na.  10.2  20.1  27.3  28.2  42.6  40.1  53.2  42.7  53.2  43.0
zTable 2. Maximal and Estimated Trend Shares of Foreign-Currency-Denominated  Deposits
%  Max  Trend  %  Max  Trend
Angola  AFR  83.7  89.0  Netherlands  Antilles  LAC  20.5  21.6
Comoros  AFR  0.7  0.9  Nicaragua  LAC  71.0  69.6
Ghana  AFR  30.8  32.2  Paraguay  LAC  66.9  60.7
Guinea  AFR  31.1  30.4  Peru  LAC  70.4  72.7
Guinea Bissau  AFR  57.9  25.4  Sao Tome & Principe  LAC  51.5  50.6
Kenya  AFR  15.5  14.8  El Salvador  LAC  8.9  10.9
Malawi  AFR  31.2  17.6  St.  Kitts and Nevis  LAC  32.7  26.9
Mozambique  AFR  55.3  49.2  St. Vincent & Grenadines  LAC  3.1  5.2
Nigeria  AFR  7.4  6.9  Trinidad & Tobago  LAC  27.8  28.2
South Africa  AFR  6.2  6.4  Uruguay  LAC  84.6  83.5
Tanzania  AFR  32.9  31.2  Venezuela  LAC  0.4  1.1
Uganda  AFR  29.9  27.3  Guatemala  LAC  5.1  3.8
Zaire  AFR  69.7  43.2
Zambia  AFR  53.2  46.1  Bahrain  MED  42.2  44.1
Lebanon  MED  69.2  62.6
Antigua and Barbuda  LAC  7.3  8.8  Saudi Arabia  MED  30.0  23.8
Argentina  LAC  73.6  65.1  United Arab Emirates  MED  36.6  26.1
Bahamas, The  LAC  2.9  5.7  Yemen, Republic of  MED  52.7  47.3
Barbados  LAC  17.5  13.3  Israel  MED  20.5  19.9
Belize  LAC  2.7  2.9
Bolivia  LAC  92.6  91.6  Cambodia  EAP  94.6  96.4
Chile  LAC  10.7  9.3  China  EAP  8.9  8.4
Costa Rica  LAC  43.8  43.5  Hong Kong SAR  EAP  59.6  49.3
Doniinica  LAC  3.4  5.7  Indonesia  EAP  28.3  24.1
Ecuador  LAC  53.7  39.8  Japan  EAP  8.9  6.3
Haiti  LAC  42.5  42.5  Korea  EAP  4.7  6.0
Honduras  LAC  33.1  29.7  Lao People's Dem.  Rep.  EAP  89.7  76.2
Jamaica  LAC  23.3  24.9  Malaysia  EAP  3.8  4.6
Mexico  LAC  10.8  11.4  Mongolia  EAP  45.4  37.7  ZTable 2. Maximal and Estimated Trend Shares of Foreign-Currency Denominated Deposits (Continued)
%  Max  Trend  %  Max  Trend
New Zealand  EAP  5.6  6.7  Slovakia  ECA  17.7  18.1
Philippines  EAP  32.6  34.7  Slovenia  ECA  52.4  38.9
Viet Nam  EAP  44.9  40.8  Spain  ECA  2.2  2.6
Thailand  EAP  1.5  4.4  Sweden  ECA  2.1  3.0
Switzerland  ECA  0.6  0.3
Albania  ECA  32.1  30.6  Tajikistan  ECA  72.4  74.3
Armenia  ECA  81.2  75.0  Turkey  ECA  58.3  54.5
Austria  ECA  2.3  2.7  Turkmenistan  ECA  33.1  28.4
Azerbaijan  ECA  81.0  76.5  Ukraine  ECA  43.7  41.6
Belarus  ECA  69.4  64.2  United Kingdom  ECA  36.6  17.8
Bosnia-Herzegovina  ECA  88.8  64.1  Uzbekistan  ECA  13.8  6.1
Bulgaria  ECA  57.2  50.4
Egypt  ECA  55.6  28.9  Pakistan  SAR  31.0  23.7
Estonia  ECA  33.7  19.4  Bangladesh  SAR  0.5  3.8
FYR Macedonia  ECA  65.4  61.9  Bhutan  SAR  5.0  4.3
Finland  ECA  4.2  3.4
Georgia  ECA  81.5  70.0
Greece  ECA  35.2  28.4
Hungary  ECA  30.5  27.3
Italy  ECA  4.2  5.8
Kazakhstan  ECA  56.9  63.0
Kyrgyz Republic  ECA  66.1  65.6
Latvia  ECA  52.5  49.4
Lithuania  ECA  62.7  39.0
Moldova  ECA  49.6  52.3
Netherlands  ECA  4.7  4.7
Norway  ECA  4.1  4.7
Poland  ECA  40.2  26.2
Romania  ECA  49.0  42.4
Russia  ECA  44.0  35.5Table 3. Restrictiveness  of Rules on Resident Holdings of Foreign Currency Deposits Onshore, 2000
Mean  House-  Prior  Mean  House-  Prior
dollar.  Firms  holds  Approval  Free  switch  Index  dollar.  Firms  holds  Approval  Free switch  Index
Albania  28.8  P  I  Kyrgyz Republic  51.9  N  0
Angola  65.1  N  0  Lao People's DernRep.  58.8  N  0
Antigua &  Barbados  5.1  E  P  Latvia  45.9  0
Argentina  56.6  0  Lebanon  61.1  0
Armenia  71.5  0  Lithuania  42.8  0
Austria  1.9  N  0  Malawi  17.8  E  E  N  2
Azerbaijan  63.6  0  Malaysia  2.4  X  2
Bahamas, The  2.1  N  Mexico  8.1  E  E  N  2
Babrain  39.5  P  N  I  Moldova  38.3  0
Bangladesh  0.3  E  E  P  N  Mongolia  36.6  0
Barbados  8.9  E  E  P  3  Mozambique  48.3  N  0
Belarus  44.6  N  0  Netherlands  4.2  N  0
Belize  2.2  P  I  Neth  Antilles  17.3  0
Bhutan  3.1  N  5  New Zealand  3.8  N  0
Bolivia  86.1  0  Nicaragua  59.5  0
Bosnia-Herzegovina  73.6  N  0  Nigeria  3.9  N  0
Bulgaria  43.6  0  Norway  3.7  N  0
Cambodia  91.5  0  Pakistan  24.9  X  E  3
Chile  6.6  0  Paraguay  52.4  0
China  8.2  E  P  N  2  Peru  64.3  0
Hong Kong SAR  49.8  N  Philippines  60.6  0
Comoros  0.5  P  N  I  Poland  26.8  N  0
Costa Rica  36.5  0  Romania  29.4  N  0
Croatia  69.0  N  0  Russia  35.4  N  0
Czech Rep  10.5  0  Sao Tom6 & Principe  46.4  0
Denmark  3.4  N  0  Saudi Arabia  22.9  0
Dominica  2.6  E  X  P  4  Slovakia  14.5  P  N  I
Ecuador  28.6  0  Slovenia  39.9  0
Egypt  32.1  0  South Afica  2.1  N  0
El Salvador  6.4  N  0  Spain  1.8  N  0
Estonia  19.9  0  St. Kitts &  Nevis  20.8  E  P  4
FYR Macedonia  56.9  N  0  St. Vincent & G.  1.5
Finland  3.2  N  0  Sweden  1.4  N  0
Georgia  64.8  N  0  Switzerland  0.3  N  0
Ghana  28.1  0  Tajikistan  57.6  0Table 3. Restrictiveness  of Rules on Resident Holdings of Foreign Currency Deposits Onshore,  2000 (Continued)
Mean  House-  Prior  Mean  House-  Prior
dollar.  Firms  holds  Approval  Free switch  Index  dollar.  Firms  holds  Approval  Free switch  Index
Greece  26.8  0  Tanzania  25.0  0
Guatemala  0.8  P  N  I  Thailand  21.3  E  X  P  N  4
Guinea  25.4  N  0  Trinidad  &  Tobago  21.3  0
Guinea  Bissau  26.8  P  N  I  Turkey  44.3  N  0
Haiti  35.1  E  3  Turkmenistan  31.4  E  E  P  3
Honduras  19.7  N  0  Uganda  20.6  0
Hungary  23.7  E  I  Ukraine  32.4  P  N  I
Indonesia  20.8  0  United Arab E.  25.4  N  0
Israel  19.0  0  United Kingdom  13.4  N  0
Italy  3.8  N  0  Uruguay  79.8  0
Jamaica  19.3  0  Uzbekistan  11.4  N  0
Japan  6.7  N  0  Venezuela  0.1  N  0
Kazakhstan  47.5  E  E  P  3  Viet Nam  39.1  E  E  N  2
Kenya  10.9  N  0  Yemen, Rep. of  35.0  N  0
Korea  1.9  0  Zaire  50.6  0
Source:  IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2001. For firns and households, E denotes that only the documented
proceeds of exports or remittances can be lodged to the account; Xdenotes accounts not permitted or limited to a very narrow category of holder. P denotes
prior approval required. N denotes  local currency  accounts cannot be freely converted into foreign currency accounts. Index is a composite index obtained
by assigning E=P=I,  X=2 and summing.
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